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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
UTAH FARM BFR~JAr INSlrRANCI•: 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Plaint iff and Ht' . ..,·;}() 11rl (' nf, 
-vs-
RB~X K. CHUGG, 
Defendant and Appellant,, 
"\VLLLAHD ~\. LARSEN; In~uran('P Co111- , 
mission of the State of etah; HAL s. I 
~ BENNJ1JTT, DONALD HACKfN<l and 
RUE L. CLfi}GG, Conmti:-;Hiorwr of tllP DP-
partment ot' Busine~s Rf'g-ulation ol' the 
State of l-:-tah and 'VALTF~R. M. JONJ1~S. 
Cormni:-;:-;ioner of the lnsuram·p ConnniH-




A PJH:·al No. 
~(i:.!l 
Appeal from the District Court of the First 
Judicial District of the State of Utah 
In and for the County of Cache 
Hon. Le\\ris Jones, Judge 
BULLEN & OLSON 
E. F. ZIEGLER 
Thatcher Building, 
Logan, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
UTAH FARM BUREATT INSFHANCI': 
COMPANY, a utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff a11d Rt>s;wurlenl, 
-vs-
REX K. CHUGG, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
\\'ILLARD A. LARSJ,jN: InsurancP Co Ill-
mission of the State of Utah; HAL P..' 
BENNETT, DONALD HACKING and 
RrE L. CLEGG, Cmmnissioner of the De-
partment of Bn:-;iness Regulation of the· 
~tate of -ctah and \YALTER )f. JONJ1JS, 
Commissioner of the Insurance Connni:-;-
:'ion of the State of Utah, 
Defendants. 





On or about the 23rd day of August, H););\ in con-
sideration of the payment of a premium by Rex l{ 
Chugg, defendant and appellant, the Utah Farm Bureau 
Insurance Company, a Utah Corporation, plaintiff and 
respondent, executed and delivered a written automobile 
insurance policy to the said Rex K. Chugg in connection 
with a Dodge automobile owned by the said Rex K. 
Chugg. The said insurance company insured against 
collision, property damage and public liability in con-
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2 
nection with Ht<· use of said auton1obile for a period of 
tin1e from the 23rd da~' of August, 19;);), to and including 
tltP 23rd day of February, 1956. 
On the 27th (lay of August, 1955, approximately 3 
n1iles North of the town of Sn1ithfield in Cache County~ 
lTtalt, on r. N. Highway 91 the said Rex K. Chugg was in-
volved in an autmnobile accident with \Villard A. Larsen, 
one of the defendants herein. 
( )n or ahout the 15th day of X ovember, 1956, the 
said Willard A. Larsen con1n1enced an action in the 
Fin.-t .Judicial District in and for the County of Cache, 
Rtate of l T talt, Civil Action X o. 8202. against the said 
l{px K. Chugg for property dan1age and personal in-
juries resulting frmn the aforesaid auto accident. 
The said insurance cmnpany refused to defend the 
action or a:-;sume any reaponsibility under the said in-
:-;urancP polie~T on the ground that the said Rex K. Chugg 
was driving the said automobile at the tilne of the ac-
cident under the influence of alcohol, contrary and in 
violation of Section (i) of the Exclusions contained in 
said Po lie~·. whirh reads as follow~: 
"All eoverage under thi:-; policy i~ suspended 
wh<'n vehicle is being operated by driver who is 
under the influence of alcohol.'' 
rrhe a aid insn ranee con1pany then connnenced an 
action which is the subject of this appeal against the 
said Rex K. Clmgp; and others for the purpose of ob-
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taining frmn the said District Court a declaration of the 
leg-al rights of the insurer under the poli<·~, heretofore 
mentioned. The said District Court after taking evi-
dence concerning the que1-ition of intoxieation found that 
the said Rex K. Chugg was intoxicated at the timP of 
the accident and decreed that Section (i) of the above 
mentioned policy violated no provision of the Ftah State 
Insurance Code, and that all eoverag·p at tlw time of the 
a<"cident wa...: suspended and therefore said insurance 
eompany \Ya::-; and i::-; not now nor shall he in the future 
under any obligation for possible liability or any duty 
to either the said Rex I(. Chugg or the said Willard A. 
Lar::-;en for injuries or lo~ses resulting from said ac-
< ident. 
Statement of Points 
The defendant and appellant relies upon the follow-
ing points for a reversal of the judgment of the trial 
court. 
1. The court erred in the adrnission of testinwny 
concerning the alcoholic content of a blood specimen of 
the defendant and appellant. 
2. The court erred in the admission of testimony 
concerning a record of conviction in a criminal court of 
the defendant and appellant for a violation of the Uni-
form Act Regulating Traffic on Highways. 
3. The evidence is insufficient to support the Find-
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ing·~ of Fact of the trial Court that the defendant and ap-
pellant was at the time of the accident driving his auto-
mobil(-' under the influence of alcohol. 
-l-. The court erred in failing to decide that the pro-
vi~ion of defendant~ and appellants automobile Insur-
~ln('(• Polic~T \\·ltich reads ''all coverage under this policy 
i~ ~ll~Jwn<led when vehicle i:-: being operated h:· a driver 
wl10 is under the influence of alcohol'' void as being con-
tran- to public policy and rtah Law. 
ARGr)fENT 
Point Number 1. 
The court erred in the admission of testimony con-
('erning the alcohol content of the blood specimen of the 
defendant and appellant. 
To warrant the ad1nission into evidence of the testi-
nwny that the blood specilnen taken from the said Re:x 
K. Chugg contained alcohol it \\·a~ incmnbent upon the 
plaintiff and respondent who is hereafter referred to as 
the insurance c01npany, to prove the identity of the 
~J>e<·imen h:· la:Ting n proper foundation and if one link 
in the chain of possession is 1nissing, the testimony 
concerning tlw specimen cannot be allowed into evidence. 
l( ovak vs. District of Columbia, 160 F. 2d 588 (1947); 
.Toyrwr vs. 1 -tterhack, 196 Iowa 1040, 195 N. ,V. 594 
(1923); State vs. Weltha 292 N. W. 148 (Iowa 1949): 
State vs. Werling 13 N. W. 2d 318 (Iowa 1944) and State 
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vs. Perry 69 N. W. 2d 412 (Iowa U);)5). Ahnost all of 
the above cited cases involved crin1inal action. However, 
the rule set forth above which is supportNl h:T the above 
c·Hed <·.a~e~ i~ clearly applicable to rivil action PYPn though 
the burden of proof ma:· he different than in crirninal 
actions. 
In the present case the foundation rwee~.--at·:T is total-
ly lacking·. The doctors testimon:T concerning taking of 
tlw blood rnerely show~ that thP doctor arrived at the 
~wene of the accident and found the defendant and ap-
pellant unconscious (Tr. 14 and 15) and that ''1fy mem-
or:v doesn't serve me a hundred per cent on it. I don't 
remember personally taking it, but the records state 
that I did.'' The doctor later clarified the record he 
referred to was the laboratory record. (Tr. 16) In re-
sponse to a question ''To whom wa~ the blood smnple 
given~" the doctor answered, "I don't remember ... " 
(Tr. 17) Pnder cro~~ examination thP doctor stated 
"\\'ell I don't remen1her who drew it." The doctor was 
then asked "Did you see the blood san1ple after that 1" 
The doctor replied "No". The doctor further testified 
"That's right" to the question, "And you have no per-
sonal knowledge of where it was frorn that time on." 
(Tr. 19) 
The only other testimony concerning the blood 
sample was that of Marie Viebell who testified that 
she had a record concerning a Rex K. Chugg which 
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~howed blood to havP been taken on August 22, 1955 and 
that the test was run upon the srw<·imen . \ ugust 28, 
1 !f);). rrllP witness, ~r arie Yiebell, then over the objection 
of c·ounsf•l for the appellant tPstified that it was dra-wn 
hy Dr. Rohert S. Budge but that she had no part in 
drawing the blood (Tr. 6 and 7) The record does not 
show how, whPn or from \vhmn ~f arie Yiebell gained 
possession of the blood specin1en nor does the record 
show the ha:-;is of her statement that the speci1nen was 
taken b~' Dr. Robert S. Budge. Even assuming that the 
doctor did take the specimen we have a situation in which 
no foundation was established. The record does not show 
when or \dJPrP the blood was taken, who had possession 
of the blood after it was taken, hm:v the blood got into the 
possession of :Marie Yiebell and "~hat happened to the 
blood after it came into the possession of the said !:farie 
Yiebell. 
Point No.2 
The court erred in ad1nission of testilnony concern-
ing the record of conviction in a cri1ninal court of the 
defendant and appellant for a violation of the Uniform 
Act Regulating Traffic on Highwa~~s. 
Over the objection of counsel for Rex K. Chugg 
tliP < 1 lerk of thP Cit~~ Court was allowed to testify that 
in tlH• Cit~· Court of Logan City a Rex J(. Chugg was 
convicted, in the case of State of rtah vs. Rex K. Chugg, 
after entering a plea of guilty. of the offense of drunk 
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7 
driving. (Tr. ~. 9 and 10) ~ineP the action wa~ broug-ht 
in the name of thP ~tate of rtah WP must assume that 
the eriminal adion ~wa~ ha~ed on a Yiolation of -1-1-()--i-1-
rtah Code Annotated 1953. (1Tniform ~\d RPgulating 
Traffic on HiglnYa.n:) 
In thi~ state it is not JH-'e<>~~an· for the defendant aw1 
appellant to rPl~- on the g-eneral rule that a judgement m' 
('Onvietion in a <'riminal ('a;;.:e i~ not admi~:-;able in a 
civil ease, as evidence of the facts upon which it i~ ba~P<l. 
heean~P Section 41-6-170 r-tah Cn<1P A.nnotated 19;):1 
provides as follows: 
''No reeord of tlte conviction of any person l'Pr 
an~· violation of tl1is act shall be admissable a:-; 
evidem·e in any court in any civil action.'' 
Counsel for the plaintiff and respondent in his oral 
argument to the trial court contended that this ~tatntP 
was not applicable because the defendant in the case of 
State of 1 · toh vs. Rex K Chugg entered a plea of guilt~' 
and therefore, was not convicted of an offense a~ contem-
plated h~- -1-1-6-170 r tal1 Code Annotated. lT nder Utah 
Law a conviction can he based upon a plea of guilt~-. 
77-1-11 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provi<1e~ in part: 
''No person shall be convicted of a public offense 
unless by the verdict of a jury, accepted and n•-
corded by the court, or upon a plea of guilty ... '' 
In the case of Warren vs. Marsh, 11 N. W. (2d) 528 
(:Minn. 1943) the Minnesota court interpreted a Minne-
sota statute which is identical to 41-6-170 of the Utah 
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Code and in :-:o doing found tlu_. question raised by coun-
sel as being without 1nerit. At page 530 of the opinion 
the Minnesota court ~tates, 
''Defendant asserts that the statute is inapplicable 
to an oral plea of guilt~' and that the testimony 
was ad1nissible as an admission against interest 
.... r:rhe legislature, however, in our opinion, has 
closed the door to an inquiry into a violation 
under the traffic act in any civil action.'' 
The court goes on to sa~· at Page 531: 
"He [defendant] asserts that the phra:-:t> · 'Reeord 
of Conviction'' doe:-: not apply to an oral plea of 
guilty. Such a conclusion we believe results in 
too narrow of construction of a statute and fails 
to take into consideration the general purpose 
of the provision. The word ''conviction·' in eludes 
a plea of guilty a:-: well as finding of guilty.'' 
'' Appl:·ing· the te:-;t of eonstruction to the 
statute under consideration, we haYe no hesitancy 
in arriving at the conclusion that the legislatun• 
intended to prohibit tlw a:-:king of the Yrry Cilles-
tion put to the plaintiff in this case, as to whether 
or not he had pleaded guilty in Justice Court to 
a ,·iolation of the State Highway Traffic Regula-
tion Art. 
'' 2. Defendant contends that even though 
tl1P court was in error in pennitting the question 
to be asked, plaintiff waived the error by his in-
terrogation of the "·itnesses concerning the cir-
enmstanees of the trial before the justice. We 
feel that this contention is not well taken. Waiver 
is tlw Yolnntar:· relinquislunent of a known right. 
Plaintiff n1ade ti1nely objection to the question 
and protected his record. After the adverse rul-
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ing b~, tlw court, there was nothing for the plain-:-
tiff to <io hut make thP best of the situation hnd 
<'ll<lPaYor to explain the circumstances surround-
ing the plea. ThiH did not constitute a wnin•r on 
hi . ..; part." 
Point Number 3 
The evidence i~ insufficient to t:mpport tlw Find-
ing~ of Fact of the Court that thP defendant and ap-
pellant wa~ at thP ti111e of the accident driving his auto-
mohilP under the influence of alcohol. 
The onl~, other PYi<lPlH'P the t•ourt could have relied 
upon for its finding that the defendant and appellant 
wa~ under thP influence of alcohol at tlw time of the 
arcident was the testinwny of the deputy slH·riff who 
arri''Pd at the place of the accident shortly after it oe-
cured (Tr. 20). ThP deput~· sheriff testified that he 
put his head in the window of the automobile for ''a 
minute" and that he could smell liquor (Tr. 22) Basr~d 
solely on this observation of the defendant for a 1ninute 
and although the record clearly shows that the defendant 
and appellant was suffering frmn pronounced shock (Te. 
1:> and 17) and was at all times unconscious, the deputy 
sheriff stated that in his opinion the defendant was in-
toxicated. ( Tr. 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23.) Certainly the one 
fact that the smell of liquor was cmning frmn the de-
fendant and appellant cannot be a valid basis for the 
opinion of the sheriff's deputy that the defendant and 
appellant was intoxicated. State vs. Johnson, (1930), 
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76 U 84, 88, 287 P. 909, at Page 911. 
Point Number 4 
The court erred in failing to hold the provision of 
the autmnobile insurance polie~· which reads ''All cc.v-
erage under this policy is suspended when vehjcle is 
heing operated hy a driver who is under the influence of 
alcohol" void as contran· to public poliey and rtah 
Law. 
Although in our opinion the record is insufficient to 
support the court finding that the defendant and appel-
lant, Rex K. Chugg, wa~ intoxicated and therefore the 
court had no basi8 on which to decide that violation of 
the al>ovP provisjon suspended all coverage under the 
insurance contract, \H' will for the purpose of this argu-
lnent assume Rex I{. Chugg was under the influence of 
alcohol. -t-1-12-21 (f) F ta h Code Annotated, 1953 (Safety 
Responsibilit~· Aet) in part provides: 
'' 11:,·pn· .\I otor vehicle liability policy shall be 
suhjPd to the following provisions which need 
not be contained therein: ( 1) the liability of the 
insurance carrier with re3pect to the insurance 
required hy this act shall hecmne absolute when-
ever injun· or danmp:e covered by said 1notor YP-
hicle or liability policy occurs~ ... and no viola-
tion of said policy shall defeat or void said poli-
cy;" 
Clearl~· the purpose of the safet~· responsibility act 
1s to make certain that the public is con1pensated for 
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dan1age and injuries suffered as a result of automobile 
accidents. It is obvious from reading this statute quoted 
above that the above 1nentioned exclusion contained in 
the policy is rendered void. 
The cases involving this point are collected in 1 ALR 
2d 822, as supplemented in 29 ALR 2d 811. 
CONCI,USIONS 
The court erred in admission of testimony concerning 
the alcoholic content of a blood specinw11 of Rex K. Chu)~·g 
and the ad1nission of testimony concerning the record of 
conviction of the defendant and appellant, Rex To\::. Chngg, 
for a violation of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic On 
Highway~. Therefore, there was no evidence to support 
the finding of the trial court that the defendant and ap-
pellant, Rex K. Chugg, was at the tin1e of the collision 
with the said Willard A. Larsen driving his automo-
bile while under the influence of alcohol. 
Even if there is sufficient evidence to support ~he 
courts finding that the defendant and appellant, Rex 
K. Chugg, was driving his automobile while under the 
influence of alcohol the provision of the insurance policy 
which suspends coverage in the event ''vehicle is being 
operated by a driver who is under the influence of alco-
hol'' should have been declared void by the trial court as 
being contrary to public policy and the Utah Safety 
Responsibility Act. 
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Therefore it follows that the judgement of the trial 
court should be reversed. 
Dated this 31st day of December, 1956. 
Respectfully submitted 
BULLEN & OLSON 
E. F. ZIEGLER 
Thatcher Building, Logan, Utah 
Attorneys for defendant and 
appellant. 
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